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ARGUMENT 
I. A DE MINIMIS BENEFIT TO AN EMPLOYER IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT AN ACTIVITY IS WORK-RELATED IF THAT 
ACTIVITY OCCURS AWAY FROM AN EMPLOYER-CONTROLLED 
PREMISES. 
Mr. Tjas and the Labor Commission argue that as long as there is some benefit to 
the employer in the action taken by the employee at the time of the injury, the activity 
should be considered "incidental" to employment, and thus within the course of 
employment for purposes of determining compensability. This argument is flawed 
because it fails to recognize the great difference in the manner in which the courts have 
analyzed the issue of course of employment for injuries which occur away from an 
employer-controlled facility. 
A, Injuries From "On Premises" Activities Are Generally Found 
"Incidental" to Employment, and Therefore Compensable, Even 
Without Any Specific Employer Benefit. 
The parties all agree that Utah law defines "in course of employment" in terms of 
three elements: (1) time, (2) place, and (3) circumstances of the activity. See Walls v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 857 P.2d 964 , 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing 1 A. Larson, 
Workmenfs Compensation Law § 14.00 (1993)). Traditionally, time and place have been 
easily satisfied because the employee has set work hours and performs the work at an 
employer-controlled facility. Much of the case law has consequently focused on the 
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nature of the activity at the time of the accident. 
Professor Larson has observed that courts seem to "divide employment-related 
activities into two groups: actual performance of the direct duties of the job, and 
incidental activities such as seeking personal comfort, going and coming, engaging in 
recreation, and the like." 1 A. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation, Desk Edition, § 
21.81, pg 5-26 (1998). He explained that while actual performance of direct duties of the 
job will always be within the course of employment, "incidental acts have no such 
necessary status as part of the employment. They have to fight for their position and be 
prepared to prove themselves incidents of the work. In other words, the word 'incident' 
contains an element of the usual and reasonable, both as to the needs to be satisfied and 
as to the means used to satisfy them." Id 
1. "Incidental" Activities Covered By the Personal Comfort 
Doctrine. 
The "personal comfort doctrine" has developed through case law to allow for 
coverage for "such incidental acts as eating, drinking, sleeping, resting, washing, 
smoking, seeking fresh air, coolness or warmth, and the like" while on the employer's 
premises. Id. at 5-3. See Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 675 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1983) (employee's death from drowning on employer's premises during lunch break was 
compensable); Askren v. Industrial Comm'n, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964) (fall in cafeteria 
on company premises was compensable). 
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The liberal definition of compensable activities under this rule may be explained 
by the fact that the elements of time and place are clearly established and are within the 
control of the employer. See 1 A. Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation, Desk 
Edition, § 21.21(a) (1998). When an employee engages in these same "incidental 
activities" away from the employer's facility, they are presumed not to be work-related. 
Rather, when an employee eats, baths, dresses, rests, smokes, or seeks fresh air away 
from the employer's work site, it is considered a purely personal activity unless and until 
the employee demonstrates some special work relationship, i.e., during travel on behalf 
of the employer. See Ralph's Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B.. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 164 (Cal. 
App. 2 Dist 1997). 
2. Recreational Activities on the Employer's Premises Are 
Generally Compensable Without Any Tangible Benefit to the 
Employer. 
Similarly, recreational activities may also be considered "incidental" to 
employment. The general rule that has developed in this area has, again, made "[t]ime 
and place . . . the decisive elements in determining compensability." Black v. 
McDonald's, 733 P.2d 154, 157 (Utah 1987). If the activity is within the normal work 
hours and on company premises, it is "usually found to be work-related." IdL Notably, 
"[e]ven if only one of these elements is present, the fthe case has made a strong start/" Id. 
Thus, even if the employer gains no tangible or substantial benefit from the recreational 
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activity, it is usually considered a compensable activity because it occurs at a time and 
place well within the employer's control. When these two elements are not within the 
employer's control, and where the employee enjoys considerable freedom in his 
activities, the presumption shifts and the employee must show either a greater benefit to 
his employer or a direct work-relationship to the activity. 
B. The Majority Rule Requires More than a "Merely Incidental" Benefit 
to the Employer for Injuries Which Occur Away from the Employer's 
Premises.1 
1. Recreational Activities Away From the Employer's Premises 
Requires a Higher Showing of a Work Relationship. 
In contrast to the rule discussed above, when a recreational activity occurs away 
from the employer's premises and during off-hours, the employee is required to show a 
much stronger work-relationship through the following factors: (1) degree of employer 
initiative, promotion, and sponsorship; (2) financial support and equipment furnished; 
and (3) employer benefit. Black, 733 P.2d at 157. The Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the degree of employer control, or lack thereof, evidenced through these factors was to be 
1While Mr. Tjas1 cites several personal injury cases, Christensen v. Swenson, 874 
P.2d 125 (Utah 1994), Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), and 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), which he asserts stand for the 
proposition that activities which are considered "incidental" to employment need not be 
limited to activities on the employer's premises, this Court should note that the Supreme 
Court in Clover expressly recognized that "the policies behind workers' compensation 
law differ from the policies behind respondeat superior." 771 P.2d at 1060. 
Accordingly, rules of law from personal injuries cases are generally inappropriate for 
workers compensation cases. 
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weighed heavily in evaluating whether the activity would be considered in the course of 
employment. Notably, the court expressly stated that merely incidental benefits to the 
employer, i.e., increased work efficiency and employee morale, would not be sufficient to 
link the activity to the employment. Id. 
Pursuant to this rule, if an employee is injured while playing basketball during a 
lunch break on the employer's back lot, the accident would likely be found to be 
compensable even though the employer clearly receives no tangible benefit from 
allowing the employee the pleasure of this diversion. See 1 A. Larson, Larson's Workers' 
Compensation. Desk Edition, § 22.11, pg. 5-38 (1998). However, considering whether 
an employee should receive workers compensation benefits for an injury he receives 
while playing basketball on his home driveway or patio, the answer should clearly not be 
the same. While the "benefit" to the employer in each of these situations is the same (i.e., 
good morale, better health, etc.), the complete lack of employer control shifts the court's 
focus to the activity, and requires the employee to show a much stronger work-
relationship to the activity. 
2. The Going And Coming Rule Requires a Higher Showing of a Work-
Relationship for Travel Away from the Employer's Premises. 
While, in the broadest sense, employment is the cause of an employee's journey 
between home and the work site, and therefore "incidental" to work, courts have 
nevertheless unanimously concluded that workers compensation was not intended to 
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protect against the perils of this journey. 1 A. Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation, 
Desk Edition, § 15.1 l,pg 4-2 (1998). Accord Wilson v. Industrial Comm'n. 207 P.2d 
1116 (Utah 1949); Chandler v. Industrial Comm'n. 208 P. 499, 500 (Utah 1922). 
Only that portion of the journey which is actually on the employer's premises 
(commonly referred to as the "premises rule") is presumed to be compensable. 1 A. 
Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation, § 15.10, pg 4-3 (1998). See, e.g.. Soldier 
Creek Coal Co. v. Bailev. 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985) (citing Larson). Otherwise, 
the employee must demonstrate a clear work relationship by facts that satisfy an 
exception to the going and coming rule in order for the journey to be found to be in the 
course of employment. 
The underlying premise of the going and coming rule "is that it is unfair to impose 
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has no 
control and from which it derives no benefit." Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 
801 P.2d 934, 938 (Utah 1989). In order to fit within an exception to the going and 
coming rule, the employee must demonstrate a clear work relationship that shows 
employer control over the worker's conduct or a substantial benefit to the employer. Id. 
See, e.g.. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) (special 
mission exception); Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Comm'n. 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1983) (dual purpose trip where the business part predominated); Kinne v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) (transportation furnished by employer); Bailey v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) (employee required to use a vehicle as an 
-6-
instrumentality of the business); Bountiful Brick v. Industrial Comm'n. 251 P. 148 (Utah 
1926) (ingress and egress at place of employment are inherently dangerous). 
In contrast, the Utah appellate courts have denied benefits when the facts show 
merely an incidental benefit to the employer from the employee's travel to and from 
work. See, e ^ , VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n. 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(driving a company vehicle is not a sufficient work relationship and the mere arrival at 
work is not a substantial benefit to the employer); Cross v. Industrial Comm'n, 824 P.2d 
1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (traveling long distances to and from a temporary work site 
was not a substantial benefit to the employer, nor is carrying work implements in the 
vehicle a sufficient benefit to the employer); Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 465 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1970) (travel to work earlier than normal for a special meeting was not essential to 
employment); Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) (the addition of 5-
6 miles to the employee's home journey was not substantial enough to make the journey a 
significant part of her employment). 
3. The Dual Purpose Rule Requires the Employee to Show a 
Paramount or Predominant Business Purpose in Order for the 
Activity to Be Compensable. 
The most analogous rule from traditional principles of workers compensation law 
which can be used to evaluate Mr. Tjas' claim is the "dual purpose rule." There is no 
dispute that Mr. Tjas had salted his home driveway for the last 30 years for personal 
reasons. The question before this Court is whether Mr. Tjas' subjective belief that he 
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might receive a work-related package from the mail carrier coming up the driveway is a 
sufficient basis upon which to find that his act of salting his driveway on that particular 
day was a work-related activity. 
The dual purpose rule has generally been invoked in the context of an employee 
who has been injured during travel. Under this rule, it is recognized that the activity, i.e., 
travel, may serve both the personal purposes of the employee and the business purposes 
of the employer. It is not enough, however, that there is some minor or incidental 
business purpose or benefit. Martinson v. Industrial Comm'n. 606 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 
1980). Rather, the employee is required to show that the business purpose was "the 
paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of the trip or other activity." Id.; 
accord Ogden Standard Examiner, 663 P.2d at 90. Put another way, the employee has 
the burden to demonstrate that if he or she had not made the trip (or performed the 
activity), the employer would have required someone else to do it. Id 
In the present case, the facts do not support the conclusion that Mr. Tjas1 salting of 
his home driveway was an activity which would be compensable under the dual purpose 
rule. AE Clevite did not require Mr. Tjas to maintain his home or yard in any manner as 
a part of his job duties. No clients or company representatives ever went to Mr. Tjas' 
home. Certainly AE Clevite would not have required another employee to salt Mr. Tjas' 
driveway on the day of the accident if he had not done it himself. As to the predominant 
or primary purpose, Mr. Tjas honestly admitted that he would have salted the driveway 
even he had not been expecting a work package since he had worried about someone 
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falling on this steep driveway for years. Certainly, he knew that he could be subject to 
personal liability for such an injury as the owner of the home. 
C. Mr. Tjas' Mental Intent to Salt His Driveway, and Potentially Benefit 
His Employer, is an Insufficient Ground on Which to Award Workers 
Compensation Benefits. 
Mr. Tjas has argued that his intent and purpose for salting his driveway on that 
particular day was motivated by work and, thus, renders his claim compensable. This 
Court should reject the proposal that a subjective, mental intent is sufficient grounds 
upon which to impose liability upon an employer. Mental intent has never been a 
sufficient basis for awarding workers compensation benefits. See, e ^ , Martinson, 606 
P.2d at 258. Rather, objective facts must adequately demonstrate that the activity 
engaged in at the time of the accident was sufficiently work-related to impose liability 
upon the employer and its insurance carrier. This outcome supports the purpose of the 
statutory limitation that benefits may only be awarded for injuries which arise out and in 
the course of the employment. Without this limitation, the employer and carrier would 
become the general insurer for any and all injuries. 
In Martinson, the Supreme Court observed that workers compensation "coverage 
does not, and as a practical matter, cannot extend to any injury done to an employee 
wherever and whenever it happens, but is limited to accidental injures which occur in the 
course of or arise out of the performance of his duties." 606 P.2d at 257-258. Notably, 
"[a] special problem exists in some occupations such as salesmen, where there is 
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elasticity both as to the place and hours of such performance." Id. at 258. Thus, when an 
activity allegedly involves a mixed business and personal purpose, the employee should 
only be deemed to be in the course of employment when the objective facts demonstrate 
that the paramount or predominant purpose of the activity is to serve the employer's 
interest. If the business purpose is "merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person 
should not be deemed to be in the course of his employment." Id 
The facts of the present case do not meet this standard. Rather, the facts show 
that while Mr. Tjas may have been waiting for a work package, he did not know when it 
would come or who would be bringing it. While Mr. Tjas claims that he was concerned 
about the mail carrier bringing a large and awkward package, he never saw the mail 
carrier with such a package. The objective facts show that Mr. Tjas had no greater work-
related reason to salt his driveway on the day of the accident than he would have had on 
any other day. Finally, Mr. Tjas honestly admitted that he would have salted his 
driveway even if he had not been expecting a work package. Any mental impression that 
he might benefit his employer by salting his driveway was merely tangential to his 
typical duty as a home owner. 
II. WORKERS COMPENSATION BENEFITS SHOULD BE AWARDED 
ONLY FOR INJURIES INCURRED DURING THE ACTUAL 
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES AT A HOME WORK SITE. 
The issue of work-at-home injuries is a relatively unprecedented area of the law. 
Traditionally, employees have performed their work under the watchful eye of their 
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employer. Recently, however, employers and employees have taken advantage of 
technological advances which allow employees greater flexibility in their work, i.e., 
telecommuting and virtual offices. While the employee and the employer may both 
benefit from this new work arrangement, the value of this benefit must not be outweighed 
by expanding the area of activities that will be covered by workers compensation such 
that the employer becomes the general health and disability insurer for practically any 
and all injuries. The court should therefore be mindful of these policy considerations in 
fashioning a rule which will apply to this new work arrangement. 
Professor Larson's proposed rule for work-at-home injuries is that injuries may be 
found compensable if the accident occurs during the actual performance of the work. 1 
A. Larson, Larson's Workers1 Compensation. Desk Edition, § 18.34 (1998). The classic 
example is an injury to a police officer while cleaning his gun at home. Once it is 
established that this is a duty that the officer is expected to perform at home, the activity 
will be considered work-related and therefore compensable. Id 
Accordingly, the first step in the court's analysis should be to identify the 
employee's actual work duties. If an injury occurs while the employee is engaged in 
these activities, it should be found compensable. See, e.g.. Hafer v. Industrial Comm'n. 
526 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1974) (Since the salesman's assigned work duties including keeping 
the company car in a safe and efficient running condition, an injury while working on the 
car at a local service station was found compensable.); accord Moser v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968). 
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It is a mistake, however, to extrapolate beyond the employee's actual duties to find 
that anything tangentially related to these duties is an "incident" of employment at a 
home work site. For example, while an injury to a policeman while cleaning his gun at 
home may be found compensable, activities tangentially related to cleaning the gun 
should not be considered compensable, i.e., cleaning clothes which were soiled by the 
grease from the gun should not be considered an "incidental" activity. 
A. The Majority of Courts Have Focused on the Relationship 
Between the Activity at the Time of the Injury and the 
Employee's Actual Work Duties. 
The majority of the courts that have evaluated cases involving injuries occurring at 
home have consistently looked for a substantial, rather than a merely incidental, work 
relationship between the activity act the time of the injury and the employee's actual work 
duties. 
In cases where compensation has been awarded, the facts have demonstrated that 
the employee was engaged in a clearly defined work duty at the time of the accident. See 
American Red Cross v. Wilson. 519 S.W.2d 60 (Ark. 1975) (The employee was solely 
responsible for providing Christmas decorations for various local nursing homes. Her 
injury from a fall while obtaining these items from storage in her attic was therefore 
compensable.); Brogger v. Kezer. 626 P.2d 700 (Colo. 1980) (An employee's fall off a 
ladder while painting the home which was used, and a portion of the mortgage paid, by 
the company as an office was compensable. Painting the home was a "necessary facet" 
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of the employer's business since clients were entertained at the home, and the employee's 
traditional work duties, at other office locations, included maintenance work and 
painting.); Tovish v. Gerben 630 A.2d 136 (Conn. 1993) (An injury while shoveling 
snow was compensable since it was performed solely to enable the employee to move his 
car to visit customers.)2; Ready's Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 65 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 
1953) (An injury from an accidental discharge of a shotgun was compensable upon the 
finding that employee was found to be in the act of working on the company books at the 
time that she moved the gun off of the couch where she performed her work.)3; Moore v. 
Family Service of Charleston County. 237 S.E.2d 84 (S.C. 1977) (The employee's fall 
while carrying books down her stairway was compensable as it was part of a special 
mission of the employer who had instructed the claimant to take the books home to 
undertake special preparation for a meeting the next day.)4; Security Union Ins. Co. v. 
McClurkin. 35 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1931) (An employee's injury from 
stepping on a needle just after a business telephone call with the employer was 
2Notably, the dissent in this case argued that the employee was engaged in a 
merely preliminary activity in preparation for work rather than an actual work duty. The 
dissent's argument is consistent with the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in Owen v. 
Chrysler Corp., 371 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1985), where the court denied benefits under a 
very factually similar claim. 
3This was a split 4-4 decision with a vehement dissent declaring, "This one is just 
too fantastic." Compare Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burnett. 283 S.W. 2d 783, 784 (Tex. 
Com. App. 1926) (An injury from an accidental discharge of a gun while removing it 
from the care he was preparing for a business trip was not compensable.). 
4But see Glasser, infra, p. 14. 
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compensable. The employee's duties involved being on call at all times, and employer 
had installed and paid for the telephone in the employee's home.)5. 
In contrast, in cases where compensation has been denied, the vast majority of 
courts have determined that the injured worker failed to demonstrate a sufficient work 
relationship between the activity at the time of the injury and the employee's actual work 
duties. See Russellville Gas Company v. Duggar. 260 So.2d 393 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert, 
denied 260 So.2d 395 (Ala. 1970) (Benefits were denied to a claimant who slipped and 
fell while walking to an employer-owned vehicle parked in the employee's yard. The 
Court found that it was "merely incidental" that the employee's means of transportation 
was a company truck which he might have used to perform a service for his employer if 
called during the weekend. The court noted that had the employee actually been 
responding to a call from the employer to use the truck for a work related purpose, they 
would have no difficulty placing him within the protection of the workers compensation 
act.)6; Ralph Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B.. 68 Ca. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (The 
employee's telephone call with the employer was not a service incidental to his 
employment.); Glasser v. Youth Shop. 54 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1951) (A slip and fall on a 
home stairway was not compensable notwithstanding the fact that the employee was 
5But see Ralph's, infra, p. 14; Lloyd's, infra, p. 15. 
6But Cf Black River Dairy v. Dept. of Industry. 207 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (An 
injury from a slip and fall while walking from home to the employer's truck was 
compensable since the employee's work commenced the moment he left the door of his 
home.). 
-14-
carrying a work record book.); Thompson v. Heckendorn Manf. Co.. 367 P.2d 72 (Kan. 
1961) (Compensation denied because installing a storm window in the family home 
which was also used for the corporate office was not incidental to the corporation's 
business); Guaglino v. Ace Bakery Div. of Lakeland Bakery. Inc.. 275 So.2d 874 (La. Ct. 
App. 1973) (An electrocution injury while using a blower from the employer's bakery 
was not compensable. The employee failed to show that he brought the blower home for 
a business purpose and that he had any business purpose to use it at the time of his 
injury.); Owen v. Chrysler Corp.. 371 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1985) (shoveling snow to 
move a car was merely preparatory work rather than the employee's actual work duties); 
Fingers v. Mt. Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1969) (An injury 
while descending steps was not compensable. The custodian who lived on-site was found 
not to be performing any duty for which he had been employed at the time of the injury.); 
Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co.. 349 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (The incidental benefit 
to the employer was not so appreciable as to render the claimant's aesthetic positioning of 
plants at her home to be an actual work duty.); Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist Church. 
147 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1966) (injury arose from a personal act which was only of 
incidental benefit to the employer); Van Devander v. West Side M.E. Church. 160 A. 763 
(N.J. 1932) (The employee was performing a household duty for his own benefit which 
was insufficiently related to his actual work duties as a minister.); Roberts v. Stell. 367 
N.W.2d 198 (S.D. 1985) (The court rejected the claimant's argument that grocery 
shopping was naturally related and incidental to living and eating on-site, as required by 
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the nature of her employment.); Lloyd v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 280 S.W.2d 955 
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1955) (An employee's injury while descending a ladder to answer a 
phone call which may have been work-related was not compensable). 
The crucial element in this case is that Mr. Tjas was not engaged in the actual 
performance of any work duties. Mr. Tjas' work duties at this home were limited to 
performing paperwork related to his sales business, generally accomplished one day a 
week in his basement. (R. at 276, p. 7.) Mr. Tjas' work instruments — the computer, 
printer, telephone line, telephone, and answering machine — were kept in a den in his 
basement. (R. at 276, p. 10-11.) Mr. Tjas never met clients or company representatives 
at his home. Rather, all work contacts were made at locations away from his home. (R. 
at 276, pp. 27-48.) AE Clevite had no requirements of Mr. Tjas, express or implied, to 
maintain his home in any manner for his employment. 
Even if the court were to assume some sort of implied duty of Mr. Tjas to maintain 
his work area, this duty should reasonably be limited to the portion of Mr. Tjasf basement 
where he kept his work items since, as the Labor Commission conceded in its order, Mr. 
Tjasf working arrangement "did not transform every part of his home into a work 
premise, nor was every activity undertaken by Mr. Tjas in his home work-related." (R. at 
267.) To expand any implied duty which Mr. Tjas had to include the home driveway 
would be unreasonable. 
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B. The Labor Commission Adopted an Unreasonably Broad 
Standard for Activities That Will Be Considered Covered 
Under the Workers Compensation Act 
The Labor Commission's conclusion that Mr. Tjas' injury arose out of and in the 
course of his employment with AE Clevite is based upon the premise that it was integral 
to employment to have work-related items delivered to Mr. Tjas' home. The Commission 
then concluded that any activity taken with the intent of assisting the accomplishment 
these deliveries is "incidental" to the work and therefore compensable. This conclusion 
results in the Commission's error — the broad expansion of activities that will be 
considered work-related at a home work site. The standard is unreasonably broad and 
completely erodes the statutory requirement that limits compensation to injuries which 
"arise out of and in the course of employment." 
Under the Commission's standard, any time that Mr. Tjas cleared or salted his 
driveway would be a work-related activity because he could receive work-related items 
in the mail that day. Mr. Tjas did not, in fact, receive any work-related mail on the day of 
the injury. He did not observe the mail carrier bringing him the reportedly large and 
awkward package. Instead, he plainly and simply saw the mail carrier. Further, it was 
only a possibility that the mail carrier, versus the U.P.S. or a Federal Express agent, 
would be bringing the work package. Thus, the Labor Commission's opinion stands for 
the rule that a personal belief 'that a mail carrier might bring a work-related package to a 
home work-site transforms an otherwise purely personal, homeowner activity (one which 
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Mr. Tjas admitted he would have undertaken in any event) into a work-related activity 
which is covered by the Worker Compensation Act. 
The Court should consider the application of this newly-created standard in other 
instances involving general homeowner responsibilities. For example, in a traditional on-
premises work situation, the work site may be heated or cooled by the employer 
according to the changing temperature. Should an employee, seeking to be warmer or 
cooler, suffer an injury related to this activity, the injury will be compensable because the 
employee's activity will be considered "incidental" to employment under the personal 
comfort doctrine. This result is reasonable, since the employer controls the facility and 
circumstances of the work site. However, in the situation of a home work site, the 
employee has personal duties as a homeowner to maintain the furnace and swamp cooler. 
Under the Labor Commission's new lax standard, the homeowner's activity of trying to 
fix the swamp cooler or to prepare it for winter are now magically transformed into a 
work-at-home employee's "incidental" activity to maintaining a comfortable work 
environment. Similarly, the homeowner's risk of injury from lighting a pilot light in the 
furnace now becomes the work-at-home employee's risk of injury from the "incidental" 
activity of obtaining heat for his "office." Clearly, this standard is far too broad, and it 
fails to recognize the great difference between activities engaged in by an employee at an 
employer-controlled facility versus a home work site. 
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C. Cases Involving Good Will or Good Samaritan Actions by 
an Employee are Inapplicable to the Facts of the Present 
Case. 
The Commission has argued that Mr. Tjas' activity in broadcasting the salt on the 
day of the accident was an effort to assist another person in advance of his employer's 
interest, and therefore a compensable activity. In support of this argument, the 
Commission cites U.S. Steel v. Draper. 613 P.2d 6508,509 (Utah 1980) and § 27.02 of 
Larson's Workers Compensation treatise. (Commission's Brief at 13.) Notably, in 
Draper, the employee died from a heart attack after running to check on a problem with a 
co-worker. The facts showed that the employee's working conditions and his exertion 
while running had caused the heart attack. Similar to the analysis used in personal 
comfort doctrine cases, the court concluded that assisting a co-worker in distress was a 
reasonable extension of the employee's work duties. 
Notably, the section of Larson's treatise quoted by the Commission includes the 
negative or unsupportive citation of this Court's opinion Walls v. Industrial Commission. 
857 P.2d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Walls, the employee was injured when a keg of 
beer fell on her foot. Clearly, she was furthering her employer's interest at the very 
moment of the injury. This Court, nevertheless, found the activity was not in the course 
of her employment because she was present at the bar as a customer rather than an 
employee at the time of her injury. 
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In the present case, Mr. Tjas' icy driveway is the alleged "obstacle" which the mail 
carrier had to traverse to deliver the mail. Again, it is notable that the mail carrier did not 
bring any work-related mail to the home that day, and while Mr. Tjas asserts that he was 
concerned about the carrier bringing a large and awkward sized package to his home, he 
did not observe the mail carrier bringing any such package. Rather, the mail carrier 
brought only personal mail to Mr. Tjas. Mr. Tjas had worried for years about someone 
falling on his driveway and, consequently, had a regular practice of alternating the duty 
of clearing and salting the driveway with his son, regardless of whether he was expecting 
a work-related package. Mr. Tjas was not acting at the direction of his employer, nor was 
he acting under the belief that he was acting for the benefit of his employer. Rather, he 
was acting as a responsible homeowner, concerned about the health of others and his own 
potential liability. 
III. THE POLICY OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT REMOVE AN EMPLOYEE'S 
BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW A SUFFICIENT WORK 
RELATIONSHIP. 
The Labor Commission commences its argument with the statement of the general 
policy that the Workers Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of 
compensation. While this general policy statement is correct, the Court should not lose 
sight of the fact that the statute also places a burden of proof on the claimant to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident arose out of and in the 
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course of his employment. As this Court in Walls recognized, "While is has been said 
that the words, fin the course of,' should be receive liberal construction, they can not be 
liberalized by judicial interpretation for the purpose of allowing compensation on every 
claim asserted, thereby rendering such words meaningless." 857 P.2d at 970 (quotation 
omitted). 
The appellate courts have, on several occasions, concluded that an award of 
compensation was not justified by the facts of the case because the work-relationship was 
insufficient. Walls, 857 P.2d at 968 (Ms. Walls1 presence at the employer's premises at 
the time of the injury was strictly personal and "lacked a sufficient nexus with her 
employment to be said to be within the course of such employment."); Martinson, 606 
P.2d at 258 (Martinson's trip was primarily social and therefore not within the course of 
his employment); Drake, 939 P.2d at 184 (notwithstanding the policy of liberal 
construction, the court found the special mission exception to the going and coming rule 
inapplicable and therefore denied benefits); Bucznyski v. Industrial Comm'n, 934 P.2d at 
1177 (the employee's hotel stay a considerable distance away from the conference 
location was not necessitated by the employment); Cross, 824 P.2d at 1205 
(compensation denied based upon the ruling that transportation to a job site is not integral 
and necessary to employment as a construction work); VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 284 
(use of a company truck to drive to and from work was of inconsequential benefit to the 
employer and thus insufficient to award benefits). 
-21-
The requirement that an accident "arise out of and in the course of employment" is 
an essential element of a workers compensation claim, intended to limit liability for 
benefits to injuries which have a work relationship, rather than making the employer the 
general insurer. This limitation and policy consideration was recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Martinson v. Industrial Commission, 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980), in 
which the court stated: 
To maintain actuarial soundness and integrity of workmen's 
compensation systems, it is essential that premiums be 
collected to cover the risks involved. The coverage does 
not, and as a practical matter, cannot extend to any injury 
done to an employee where and whenever it happens, but 
is limited to accidental injuries which occur in the course 
of and arise out of the performance of his duties. 
Id. at 257 (emphasis added). 
The general policy of liberal construction of the Act does not relieve the claimant 
of his burden of proof. Moreover, the Commission should not be able to use this policy 
as a shield for awarding compensation for injuries that lack a sufficient work relationship. 
The injury in the present case is very sympathetic. This Court, however, has the duty to 
adopt and apply a standard which is appropriate for all cases, rather than one that meets 
the sympathies of the present case. See, e ^ , J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983). In J & W Janitorial Co., the Supreme Court reversed an 
Industrial Commission award of death benefits. The court acknowledged the rule of 
liberal interpretation of the Workers Compensation Act and the deference that is given 
the Industrial Commission. Nevertheless, the Court found that the Commission had 
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abused its discretion as the evidence did not support a finding that the injury arose out of 
or in the course of his employment.7 Similarly, the facts of the present case reflect, at 
best, a tenuous connection to AE Clevite's business, and therefore do not justify an award 
of compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The argument that the employee need only show that the employer receives some 
incidental benefit from the employee's activity at the time of injury in order for an injury 
to be found compensable while away from an employer-controlled site is erroneous and 
not supported by well-established principles of workers compensation law. Rather, when 
the elements of time and place are not under the control of the employer, the employee 
has a heightened burden to show that the activity engaged in at the time of the injury is 
substantially or predominantly work related. 
Compensation for injuries incurred at a home work site should be limited to cases 
in which the facts objectively demonstrate that the employee was injured while engaged 
in the actual performance of a work duty. Liability for the hazards and personal duties of 
the home should not become the responsibility of the employer unless the employee 
shows a substantial work relationship. The Labor Commission erred in applying an 
unreasonably broad standard for a work-at-home injury. 
7The statute was even broader in its application at the time of this case since it 
required only that the injury arise out of or in the course of employment. The present 
statute requires the claimant meet both of these requirements. 
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The facts of the present case do not support the conclusion that Mr. Tjas' injuries 
arose out of and in the course of his employment with AE Clevite. This Court should 
accordingly reverse the Labor Commission's order and dismiss Mr. Tjas' claim. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 1999. 
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